Immigration · Removal Flights · Third Countries · Self-Departure · The United States
ICE Deportation Flights: The Restraints, the Third Countries, and the Offer to Leave Voluntarily
ICE publishes no flight data. What is known about the removal flights comes from flight trackers watching public transponder data, from court files, from the agency’s own operations handbook, and from the department’s own statements. The record assembled here covers who flies, in what restraints, to which countries, under what court orders—and the second door the same department holds open: a paid ticket home, a stipend, and no chains, for the man who agrees to leave on his own.
The Record in Brief
Three ways out. A person under a removal order leaves the United States in one of three ways in the present record. He is flown out by ICE Air Operations on a chartered aircraft, restrained under the standard written in the agency’s 2024 operations handbook: handcuffs, waist chains, and leg irons for the duration. Or he is flown to a third country—not his own—under agreements the Department of Homeland Security has made since February 2025, a practice the Supreme Court has allowed to proceed without yet ruling on whether it is lawful; argument is set for December 2026. Or he leaves voluntarily under the department’s CBP Home program: a government-paid ticket, a stipend of $1,000 on confirmed arrival home, forgiveness of failure-to-depart fines, and no restraints reported on the voluntary flights in any account in this record.
The scale. ICE publishes no flight data of its own. Human Rights First’s ICE Flight Monitor, which tracks public flight data, counted at least 7,454 enforcement flights between January 20 and August 31, 2025—to at least 66 countries, 34 percent more than the same period in 2024 and the highest count since the tracking began in 2020—and 2,253 deportation flights to 79 countries in the year ending January 20, 2026. Gillian Brockell, a journalist and former flight attendant who built a tracker of the wide-body carrier Omni Air International, counts an average of roughly 70 ICE flights a day across all carriers in 2026 and about 25,000 people sent to nearly three dozen third countries. The two instruments count different things over different periods; both are printed here, unmerged.
The disputed numbers. Two numbers dominate the public argument, and the record carries both with their instruments attached. The department states that 70 percent of ICE arrests are of persons charged with or convicted of a crime in the United States—arrests, with charges counted alongside convictions. The independent instruments that count convictions only, among persons booked into custody or held in detention, find about 27 to 35 percent with a conviction and 5 to 7 percent with a violent conviction. On self-deportation, the department’s headline figure of 1.6 million voluntary departures rests on a survey estimate by the Center for Immigration Studies whose own authors flag it as preliminary; the department’s own releases put users of the CBP Home program itself at “tens of thousands,” and independent estimates of voluntary departures beyond the normal baseline, attributed to the enforcement climate, run from about 200,000 to 405,000 for 2025. Section 5 and Section 6 print each figure beside its method.
Related record. This report covers the flights themselves. The paper’s November 8 report, Deportation in America, set out the removal law, and its November 12 report, Deportation, Counted, counted removals and returns across eight administrations.
1. The Flights Themselves
The structure. ICE Air Operations, a division of ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations, owns no aircraft in the record through 2025. It charters them. All ICE flights are brokered through CSI Aviation under a contract worth up to $1.5 billion, according to Brockell’s reporting in The American Prospect of October 2, 2026. The carriers include GlobalX, which has flown more than half of ICE’s deportation flights in 2024 and 2025 and 74 percent of the 1,564 deportation flights counted in 2024, and Omni Air International, a charter airline based in Tulsa, Oklahoma, whose wide-body jets fly the long routes—Africa, Asia, the Middle East. ICE’s own website, in a passage a group of senators noted in 2026 had not been updated since August 8, 2023, says ICE Air stages 12 aircraft. Because ICE publishes no flight data, every count in this section comes from outside trackers reading public transponder and flight records.
The Omni record. Brockell, who worked as a flight attendant and later covered the charter industry, built her tracker from flight data after Omni crews recognized ICE passengers on their aircraft. Her count for Omni alone, from February to mid-June 2026: a minimum of 76 removal stops, 10 of them confirmed third-country removals, and 11 trips lasting 32 to 68 hours, with passengers shackled at the ankles, wrists, and waist for the duration. Flight data backed one man’s account of 73 hours or more in shackles on a routing to Laos and Vietnam; a second group’s trip ran 82 hours, the longest she recorded. Attendants who recently quit Omni described to her suicidal passengers held in full-body straitjackets and guards refusing the attendants’ safety instructions. Omni’s stated price in an earlier era of the work was $34,000 per flight hour, a figure Brockell drew from court documents in a 2019 suit over a single Asia trip priced at $1.8 million.
The Chicago end of Omni. Omni’s parent, Air Transport Services Group, was acquired by the investment firm Stonepeak in April 2025 for about $3.1 billion. Stonepeak also sought to buy Chicago’s parking-meter concession, a 75-year lease dating to 2008, and Chicago aldermen made the two deals one question: the council would not approve the meter purchase unless Stonepeak divested Omni. Committee hearings in June and July 2026 heard the flight record, including the hours passengers spend shackled. Brockell states in her article that she spoke at one of the organizing meetings and at a committee hearing in early July; the paper prints that disclosure with her findings. A negotiated settlement announced in September added reduced true-up fees, a $75 million payment earmarked for city pensions, and a 5 percent profit share estimated at $375 million over the remaining 57 years of the lease. The sale of Omni to a newly created company, OAI Holdings LLC, was announced September 28, 2026; the City Council approved the meter deal 46 to 3 on September 29, at a $2.53 billion bid; ATSG’s account dates the closing of the Omni sale to November 9, 2026. Brockell calls the Chicago outcome a blueprint that can be replicated in other cities; that is her characterization, filed below as a clipping. Three ICE charter carriers in total stopped flying ICE work in the past year, by her count, including Avelo Airlines, which ended its ICE flying amid boycott pressure and internal backlash.
2. The Restraints
The standard, in the agency’s own book. The 2024 ICE Air Operations Handbook, quoted in a May 11, 2026 letter from members of Congress to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, states that detainees transported on ICE Air aircraft “will be fully restrained by the use of Authorized Restraint Devices; i.e., handcuffs, waist chains, leg irons.” The handbook also authorizes spit masks, mittens, leg braces, cargo straps, and the WRAP, a full-body restraint suit that immobilizes the legs and torso and holds the wearer upright and seated. The manufacturer, Safe Restraints Inc., describes the device as a de-escalation tool; the department has bought $268,523 worth of the devices since late 2015, and the maker produced a modified version for ICE with a ring at the front to which cuffed hands can be attached during flights and long bus trips.
The government’s account. Asked about restraints by the Associated Press and by The Guardian, DHS spokeswoman Tricia McLaughlin gave the same answer: “The use of restraints on detainees during deportation flights has been long standing, standard ICE protocol and an essential measure to ensure the safety and well-being of both detainees and the officers/agents accompanying them,” and the practices are “fully in line with established legal standards.” The department also defended the WRAP specifically as legal and standard. ICE would not provide the AP with records documenting the WRAP’s use, would not answer detailed questions about it, and refused the AP’s request for the policy governing when and how it is used; the agency did not specify the authorities its practices align with.
The other accounts. The AP’s investigation, published in October 2025, identified multiple uses of the WRAP on deportation flights: five people described being restrained in it, sometimes for hours, on flights dating to 2020, and witnesses and family members in four countries described its use on at least seven other people in 2025. One man, a Nigerian national who is a plaintiff in a federal lawsuit, told the AP that officers woke his group at night in September 2025, shackled them, refused their requests to call a lawyer, and put them in the WRAP for a 16-hour flight to Ghana, a country none of them was from; the lawsuit alleges he was kept in the device for 16 hours, with the lower part undone once so he could use the bathroom. The AP reported that deportees said the device was used as punishment or intimidation, including for asking for attorneys or expressing fear. The AP also found that a 2023 report by the civil rights division of DHS itself had raised internal concerns about the WRAP, in part because of deaths involving its use by local law enforcement; the AP identified a dozen cases in a decade in which local police or jailers used the device and autopsies found restraint played a role in the death. Those deaths were in local custody, not on ICE flights; the paper prints the distinction because the record carries it.
The crews. ProPublica reported on April 1, 2025, from interviews with current and former flight attendants on GlobalX deportation flights, that attendants were trained to evacuate an aircraft but were never told how to evacuate passengers whose hands and legs were shackled. A typical flight carried more than 100 detainees, a dozen or more guards employed by Akima, one ICE officer, and two nurses. Attendants said they were told not to talk to the detainees, not to feed them, and not to make eye contact; some said they spoke to passengers anyway. The attendants’ stated concern was evacuation: a cabin of passengers bound at the wrists and ankles cannot move at the speed an emergency exit requires. The congressional letter of May 11, 2026, carried the same point to the FAA: former attendants, it said, revealed there was no plan or training for evacuating restrained passengers, and the members asked the agency for written answers by June 1, 2026.
3. The Third Countries
The practice. A third-country removal sends a person under a final removal order to a country that is not his own and was not named in his removal proceedings—used, the department says, where the home country will not take him or where his order names a country that cannot receive him. The expansion dates to February 18, 2025, when DHS directed its officers to review the cases of persons granted withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture for removal to third countries instead. A March 30, 2025 memorandum from Secretary Kristi Noem set the department’s procedures, resting on diplomatic assurances: a receiving government’s commitment that the person will not be persecuted or tortured. By Brockell’s tracker count, roughly 25,000 people have been sent to nearly three dozen—about 35—third countries. The receiving countries in the record include South Sudan, Eswatini, Ghana, Laos, and Vietnam.
The Djibouti episode. In May 2025 the government put a group of men—from Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Mexico, several with violent-crime convictions in the United States—on a military flight toward South Sudan, a country none of them was from, then held them at Camp Lemonnier, the U.S. base in Djibouti, for about six weeks, in a converted shipping container, while the courts decided whether the flight could proceed. A federal judge found the removal violated his injunction. The Supreme Court then cleared the way, and on July 4, 2025, a military plane flew the men to South Sudan, where, by Brockell’s reporting, they were imprisoned on arrival. Their lawyers reported no contact with them after the transfer. The court fight that produced that outcome is Section 4.
The operating rule since July 2025. On July 9, 2025, after the Supreme Court’s stay, acting ICE Director Todd Lyons issued the memorandum that now governs, summarized here from the Congressional Research Service’s account of it. Where the State Department finds a receiving country’s diplomatic assurances credible, the person “may be removed without the need for further procedures”—no individual notice process at all. Where assurances are absent or not found credible, ICE serves a Notice of Removal naming the country, read in a language the person understands; ICE does not ask whether he fears removal to that country—he must state a fear on his own; ICE then waits at least 24 hours before the removal, or as little as six hours in “exigent circumstances,” provided he has a reasonable means and opportunity to speak with an attorney and a senior DHS attorney approves. Whether assurances are credible is, under the memorandum, the State Department’s call.
4. The Case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D.
What the lower court ordered. Four men with final removal orders sued in the District of Massachusetts in March 2025. On April 18, 2025, Judge Brian E. Murphy certified a class and enjoined the government from removing any person to a third country not named in his removal order without written notice in a language he understands, a meaningful opportunity to raise a fear of persecution or torture, and, if he shows a reasonable fear, a reopening of his proceedings. On May 21, 2025, Judge Murphy found the government had violated that injunction in the Djibouti case: the men had not been given the meaningful opportunity the order required. The First Circuit declined to pause the injunction on May 26.
What the Supreme Court did. On June 23, 2025, the Supreme Court stayed the injunction. The order was brief and gave no reasons. It did not hold that third-country removals are lawful; it paused the lower court’s order while the case proceeds, which had the effect of letting the removals resume. Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. On July 3, 2025, the Court clarified that the stay also covered Judge Murphy’s May remedial order in full; the Djibouti group was flown to South Sudan the next day. The district court reached a final judgment against the government on February 25, 2026, holding that persons facing third-country removal are entitled to meaningful notice. On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court stayed that judgment as well and took the case itself, before judgment in the court of appeals, as No. 26-426. The questions it will decide include whether the district court had jurisdiction, whether it could enter class-wide relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), and whether the government’s third-country guidance is unlawful under the removal statute, the Due Process Clause, or the Convention Against Torture and its implementing law. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson would have denied the application. Argument is set for the December 2026 session. As of this report, no court has ruled on the merits; the government has won every stay, and the removals proceed under a stay, not under a holding.
5. The Other Door: Self-Departure
The offer, as the department states it. On March 10, 2025, the department renamed the CBP One application—which until January 2025 had scheduled appointments for migrants seeking protection—as CBP Home, with an “Intent to Depart” feature for notifying the government of a voluntary departure. On May 5, 2025, DHS announced travel assistance and a stipend: any person who uses CBP Home to self-deport receives $1,000, “paid after their return to their home country has been confirmed through the app.” The department books and pays for the travel, helps obtain travel documents for those without a valid passport, and deprioritizes participants for detention and removal while they prepare to leave. Secretary Noem: “If you are here illegally, self-deportation is the best, safest and most cost-effective way to leave the United States to avoid arrest.” The department’s arithmetic: an average arrest, detention, and removal costs $17,121; the CBP Home route, stipend included, was projected to cut the cost of a departure by about 70 percent. On June 9, 2025, the department added forgiveness of failure-to-depart fines for those who self-deport through the app; it said it had issued more than 9,000 fine notices totaling almost $3 billion, at rates approaching $1,000 a day. On May 9, 2025, Presidential Proclamation 10935 established Project Homecoming, directing a concierge service at airports and an exit bonus, funded in part, per the Migration Policy Institute, by $250 million in repurposed refugee-assistance funds and promoted in a $200 million international advertising campaign. On December 22, 2025, the department raised the stipend to $3,000 for those who signed up by the end of the year.
The first flight. On May 19, 2025, the department ran its first Project Homecoming charter: 64 people from Houston to Honduras and Colombia—38 to Honduras, 26 to Colombia, in the department’s own breakdown. DHS stated: “This was a voluntary charter flight, not an ICE enforcement operation,” and that all participants received travel assistance, the $1,000 stipend, and preserved the possibility of returning legally one day. The contrast with Section 2 is in the record and needs no emphasis from the desk: the removal passenger boards in handcuffs, waist chains, and leg irons under a written standard; the Homecoming passenger boards as a volunteer on a government-paid charter, with money waiting on confirmed arrival. No account in this record reports restraints on a voluntary flight.
The promise about coming back. The department says participation “may help preserve the option for an illegal alien to re-enter the United States legally in the future.” The Migration Policy Institute’s account of the same program states the statutory difficulty plainly: a person unlawfully present more than 180 days but less than a year faces a three-year bar on re-entry; more than a year, a ten-year bar; the bars apply even to those who leave voluntarily, and leaving without a judge’s grant of voluntary departure can result in a removal order. How the department’s promise and the statute fit together is not explained in the department’s releases; the paper prints both.
The uptake, by instrument. The counts divide into two kinds, and the record keeps them apart. The first kind is documented use of the program itself. More than 5,000 people had logged a return through CBP Home as of April 9, 2025, per Fox News as cited by MPI. About 35,000 had used the program’s incentives by October 2025, per The Atlantic as cited by the Center for Migration Studies. DHS-reported data summarized in trade reporting put app use at nearly 38,000 from March through November 25, 2025. And the department itself, on December 22, 2025, described CBP Home users as “tens of thousands.” The second kind is a population estimate. On September 23, 2025, the department announced that 2 million people had been removed or had self-deported since January 20, “including an estimated 1.6 million who have voluntarily self-deported”; on October 27 it raised the deportation component to more than 527,000 while leaving the 1.6 million unchanged; on December 22 it raised the self-deported component to 1.9 million. The releases publish no methodology for the figure.
Where the 1.6 million comes from, and what is said against it. The traceable basis is an August 12, 2025 analysis by Steven Camarota and Karen Zeigler of the Center for Immigration Studies, working from the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey, a monthly survey of about 60,000 households. CIS found the total foreign-born population down 2.2 million between January and July 2025 and preliminarily estimated the unauthorized population down 1.6 million, to 14.2 million. CIS’s own caveats: the decline could in part reflect immigrants’ reluctance to answer a government survey during stepped-up enforcement, and administrative data needed for the estimate was not yet available, making it preliminary. The Pew Research Center, reading the same survey, found a smaller total decline—1.4 million, from 53.3 million in January to 51.9 million in June—published no unauthorized-only figure, and cautioned that falling participation could explain part of the drop. Jed Kolko of the Peterson Institute for International Economics called the 2.2 million decline “implausibly large and uncorroborated”: the survey’s response rate fell from 68.8 percent in January 2025 to 67.1 percent in July, and under reasonable assumptions about foreign-born nonresponse, that fall “could therefore explain the entire reported decline.” Economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis reached the same mechanical point on December 29, 2025: because the survey is weighted to fixed population totals, a fall in counted immigrants appears as an equal rise in the native-born, and the implied native-born rise far exceeds the Congressional Budget Office’s projected growth. Edward Kissam of the Center for Migration Studies, triangulating from the documented figures—the app users, the government’s arrival-departure records, and Mexican survey data on returning migrants—estimated about 200,000 self-deportations by the end of 2025, about one-tenth of the department’s year-end claim. The Brookings Institution, modeling flows separately, estimated 210,000 to 405,000 voluntary departures beyond the normal baseline attributable to the enforcement climate in 2025, alongside 310,000 to 315,000 removals, and stated that “there is little data to assess the degree to which immigrants have increased their voluntary exit rates in 2025.” MPI’s summary of the whole question: because voluntary departure is self-directed, “data on the number of people who have self-deported so far are thin or anecdotal.” The historical baseline in its account: the 2008 Scheduled Departure pilot drew 8 volunteers out of 457,000 eligible. The disagreement stands as printed: documented program use in the tens of thousands; independent estimates of extra voluntary departures in the low hundreds of thousands; a survey-based population estimate of 1.6 million, carried by the department as a count of self-deportations. The instruments measure three different things.
6. Who Is on the Planes
The government’s figure, with its denominator. The department’s standing claim, repeated by Assistant Secretary Tricia McLaughlin on October 27, 2025, and since, is that “70% of ICE arrests are of criminal illegal aliens charged with or convicted of a crime in the U.S.” Three features of the claim are in its own wording: the denominator is arrests, not removals and not the detention population; the numerator counts a pending charge the same as a conviction; and it reaches any crime, with no severity threshold stated. The department adds that the figure is “just in the U.S.” and does not account for persons wanted in their home countries, INTERPOL notices, gang members, or terrorists; FactCheck.org notes the department has provided no data for the home-country claim.
The baseline in ICE’s own book. The last full annual report with a criminal-history breakdown is ICE’s FY2024 report. Of 113,431 administrative arrests that year, 81,312—71.7 percent—had a conviction or pending charges, the same combined definition as the 70 percent claim. But of the year’s 271,484 removals, only 88,763—32.7 percent—involved persons with convictions or pending charges; most removals that year began as border apprehensions by CBP, not ICE arrests. The same agency, the same definition, the same year: 71.7 percent of arrests, 32.7 percent of removals. Of the convictions held by arrested persons in FY2024, the largest category was traffic offenses, 24.7 percent; immigration offenses were 15.5 percent; assault 9.7 percent; dangerous drugs 14.1 percent. No FY2025 annual report with a criminal-history breakdown appears in the record assembled; secondary reporting of ICE’s FY2025 data puts removals at 442,637, with about 38 percent of deportees having criminal histories on the combined definition.
The independent instruments. FactCheck.org, analyzing individual-level ICE arrest data obtained by the Deportation Data Project at UC Berkeley and UCLA through FOIA litigation, for January 20 to October 15, 2025, found 36.5 percent of arrestees with prior convictions, 29.8 percent with pending charges, and about a third with neither—66 percent combined, which FactCheck describes as the figure the administration has rounded to 70. A New York Times analysis of the same project’s data over the same period found 37 percent with any conviction and 7 percent with a violent conviction. CBS News, from an internal DHS document covering 392,619 arrests from January 21, 2025, to January 31, 2026, found nearly 60 percent with charges or convictions of any kind, 13.9 percent with charges or convictions for violent offenses, and nearly 40 percent with no criminal record. The Cato Institute, analyzing nonpublic ICE book-in data leaked to it for October 1 to November 15, 2025, found 73 percent of persons booked into custody with no conviction, 47 percent with neither a conviction nor pending charges, and 5 percent with a violent conviction; the department called the analysis “made up,” and Cato answered that it had checked the data against three sources, including the department’s own public data, and that the department’s claim counts arrests while its own counts book-ins. TRAC at Syracuse University, reading ICE detention data obtained by FOIA, counted 65,735 persons in detention on November 30, 2025, of whom 48,377—73.6 percent—had no criminal conviction; TRAC’s series counts convictions only, so a person with a pending charge and no conviction stands in the 73.6 percent. The Migration Policy Institute, in an October 2026 analysis of FOIA and Deportation Data Project records covering January 20, 2025, to July 31, 2026, counted about 980,000 deportations—its term covers formal removals and returns together—of which 190,000, or 20 percent, involved a person with a criminal conviction; among formal removals only, 31 percent. Its most common conviction categories among criminal removals were illegal entry and re-entry, 23 percent, and traffic offenses including DUI, 21 percent. The department rejected the MPI analysis.
The disagreement, printed. The instruments do not contradict each other so much as they count different populations at different doors of the same building. Count arrests, and count a charge as a conviction, and the criminal share is 60 to 70 percent. Count the people actually held or booked, convictions only, and the convicted share is 27 to 35 percent, with violent convictions at 5 percent of book-ins (Cato) and violent charges or convictions at 13.9 percent of arrests (the department’s own internal document, via CBS). Count removals, and ICE’s own FY2024 figure is 32.7 percent charged or convicted; MPI’s conviction figure for 2025–26 is 20 percent of all deportations and 31 percent of formal removals. Two adjustments move every number in the set: pending charges add roughly 30 points wherever they are counted, and immigration and traffic offenses—the two largest conviction categories in both ICE’s and MPI’s tables—are counted as criminal convictions in every instrument here. The claim that most of the people on the planes are dangerous criminals is not carried by any instrument in this record: on the only measures that separate violence out, violent convictions stand at 5 to 7 percent. The claim that the planes carry mostly people with no business being counted as criminals is equally beyond the record: on the arrests measure the department uses, a majority of arrestees have been charged with or convicted of something in the United States. Both statements are printed because the record carries both, each with its instrument named.
7. The Government’s Own Fleet
The purchase. The charter system described in Section 1 is the system the department also tried to replace. In early 2026, under Secretary Noem, DHS bought ten aircraft from Daedalus Aviation Corporation for $464 million under a no-bid contract, according to New York Times reporting summarized in an October 21, 2026 letter from Rep. Bennie G. Thompson to Secretary Markwayne Mullin: seven Boeing 737-700s, formerly flown by Avelo Airlines, for deportation operations, and three executive jets. Five of the aircraft were acquired in March 2026, on Secretary Noem’s final day in the job, at markups over recent purchase prices, per the same account. The department said a government-owned fleet would ease reliance on contract airlines and expand deportation operations; in May 2026 it said the jets would be ready for use within weeks.
The idle months, and the first flights. Flight-tracking data from ADS-B Exchange, reported by Bloomberg, showed the seven 737s parked at Lake Charles Regional Airport in Louisiana, each with fewer than five flights since April 2026. Brockell’s October 2 account had it the same way from the other side: as of her writing, the purchased Boeings had flown no removal flights at all, and could not in any case replace the charter fleets. In September 2026 the department proposed repurposing four of the jets for congressional delegations and other official travel. In late October 2026, a DHS-owned 737-700 made the fleet’s first removal flights—two trips from Texas to Mexico on consecutive days, confirmed by flight-tracking data and by Human Rights First. As of this report, the charter system still carries the removal program; the owned fleet has flown two removal trips.
8. What the Record Does Not Show
The gaps, stated. ICE publishes no flight data; every flight count in this report is an outside count, and none can be checked against an official ledger because there is none public. ICE has published no FY2025 annual report with a criminal-history breakdown in the record assembled, and the department has published no methodology for its 1.6 and 1.9 million self-deportation figures; the traceable basis for the first is a preliminary survey estimate whose authors printed their caveats with it. No court has ruled on the merits of third-country removals; the practice proceeds under a Supreme Court stay, with argument set for December 2026. No court finding on the WRAP or on the restraint standard appears in the record assembled here; the restraint record consists of the agency’s handbook, the department’s statements, an internal 2023 civil-rights report described by the AP, detainee and attendant accounts, and pending lawsuits. And no instrument in the record counts the passengers flight by flight—who was on any given plane, with what record, in what restraints, to what destination. The planes are counted. The people, in the public record, are estimated.